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Abstract—In this paper, we investigate an artificial-noise (AN)
aided secure transmission for non-orthogonal multiple access
(NOMA) full-duplex (FD) relay network. We propose a novel
joint NOMA and AN-aided full-duplex relay (NOMA-ANFDR)
scheme to enhance the physical security. In this scheme, the
optimal power allocation between the information and the AN
signal is determined such that the capacity of the two end-to-end
(i.e., two source-relay-destination pairs) channel are maximized
to ensure the highest quality of cooperative transmission. To fully
examine the benefits of the NOMA-ANFDR scheme, we derive a
new closed-form expression for the secrecy outage probability. We
show that the NOMA-ANFDR scheme significantly outperforms
the joint NOMA and AN in half-duplex relay (NOMA-ANHDR)
scheme as well as the NOMA-HDR scheme in terms of minimum
secrecy outage probability and effect secrecy throughout. This
result indicates that adopting the joint of FD and AN technique
at relays can effectively enhance the physical layer secrecy
performance in the NOMA cooperative network.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, non-orthogonal multiple access (NOMA) has re-
ceived enormous interests since it can significantly boost the
system spectral efficiency [1]. Different from the conventional
orthogonal multiple access methods such as frequency division
multiple access, time division orthogonal multiple access, and
code division multiple access, NOMA allows multiple users
to share the same resource block (i.e., time/frequency/code),
in which successive interference cancellation (SIC) has to be
performed at one receiver to suppress the interference caused
by other users’ information.
In [2], cooperative NOMA with maximum ratio combining
was studied to enhance the spatial diversity. In [3], different
relay selection strategies were proposed and analyzed in coop-
erative NOMA systems. In [4], outage probability and ergodic
sum capacity were investigated in a NOMA system with
coordinated direct and relay transmission. In [5], two source-
destination user pairs sharing a common half-duplex relay was
investigated in NOMA cooperative system. It is noted that
cooperative NOMA introduced in [2–5] all adopt half-duplex
cooperative relay mode. Meanwhile, the security of wireless
communication is a pivotal issue that needs to be addressed
in wireless networks. As a complimentary approach to the
traditional cryptographic techniques, physical layer security
has been recognized as a key solution to safeguard wireless
data transmissions and thus attracted numerous research in-
terests [6]. In the context of physical layer security, many
technologies, such as artificial-noise (AN)-aided transmission,
full-duplex techniques, and cooperative relay transmission,
have been proposed to enhance the secrecy performance of
wireless communications [7–13]. Specially, Generating AN
at the legitimate transmitter is proposed to be an effective
technique to confound the eavesdropper [8–12]. Cooperative
full-duplex relay has also been proved as an effective way
to improve the system security [9]. In [7], a physical layer
security based on AN-aided strategy was first considered
in relay networks, which can largely improve the physical-
layer security. Motivated by the benefits of relay and AN
assistance, many researchers have investigated various secure
transmission strategies, such as cooperative beamforming (CB)
[8] and cooperative jamming (CJ) [9].
Although physical layer security has been well studied
in many scenarios, the design of secrecy transmission for
NOMA cooperative is still not clear. The aim of this work
is to examine the secure performance of NOMA protocol
in cooperative networks. To answer this important question,
we focus on a similar scenario considered in [5]. However,
the authors did not consider the existence of eavesdropping
users. Furthermore, in order to improve the security of the
systems, AN-aided and full-duplex methods are applied in this
communication scenario.
In this work, we exploit the use of AN-aided and full-
duplex (FD) strategies at relay node to enhance the secrecy
in NOMA cooperative networks. Specifically, we propose a
novel joint NOMA and AN-aided full-duplex relay (NOMA-
ANFDR) scheme. In this scheme, the optimal power allocation
between the information and the AN signal is determined
such that the capacity of the two end-to-end (i.e., two source-
relay-destination pairs) channel are maximized to ensure the
highest quality of cooperative transmission. To disclose the
benefits of the NOMA-ANFDR scheme relative to the joint
NOMA and AN-aided half-duplex relay scheme (NOMA-
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Fig. 1. System model
ANFDR), we derive a new closed-form expression for the
secrecy outage probability of the NOMA-ANFDR scheme.
We also derive the secrecy outage probability of the NOMA-
ANHDR scheme as a benchmark. Our analysis demonstrates
that the NOMA-ANFDR scheme significantly outperforms the
NOMA-ANHDR scheme by achieving a lower secrecy outage
probability and a higher effect secrecy throughout when the
self-interference at the FD relay can be reasonably suppressed.
Furthermore,we also compare the AN-aided schemes (i.e.,
the NOMA-ANFDR and NOMA-ANFDR schemes) with joint
NOMA and half-duplex relay scheme (NOMA-FDR) , Our
analysis demonstrates that the AN-aided schemes perform
significantly than the NOMA-HDR scheme.
II. PROPOSED NOMA-ANFDR SCHEME IN A COMMON
FULL-DUPLEX-DF-RELAY NETWORK
We consider a secure cooperative relay network, as illustrat-
ed in Fig. 1, in which two source-destination pairs 𝑆1−𝐷1 and
𝑆2 −𝐷2 share a common FD decode-and-forward (DF) relay
𝑅. All nodes in networks are equipped with a single antenna
and operative in the full-duplex DF mode. We assume that
𝐾 eavesdroppers (E) exists in this network and overhears the
transmission from the relay. Similar to [5], we also assume that
the direct links from S to D and E are not available due to the
strong path-loss and attenuation between them. In this case,
both 𝑆1 and 𝑆2 only rely on 𝑅 to communicate simultaneously
with their corresponding receivers 𝐷1 and 𝐷2, respectively.
This assumption can be justified in case of urban areas where
nodes are placed far apart, and is also in line with previous
researches such as [3, 5].
In this work, we assume that all channels experience
block Rayleigh fading such that the channels remain constant
over one block but vary independently from one block to
another [9], and we denote 𝑓𝑆1,𝑅 ∼ 𝒞𝒩 (0, 𝑑−𝑣1𝑅), 𝑓𝑆2,𝑅 ∼
𝒞𝒩 (0, 𝑑−𝑣2𝑅), ℎ𝑅,𝐷1 ∼ 𝒞𝒩 (0, 𝑑−𝑣𝑅𝐷1), ℎ𝑅,𝐷2 ∼ 𝒞𝒩 (0, 𝑑−𝑣𝑅𝐷2),
and 𝑙𝑅,𝐸𝑘 ∼ 𝒞𝒩 (0, 𝑑−𝑣𝑅𝐸𝑘) as the channel coefficients of the
𝑆1 − 𝑅, 𝑆2 − 𝑅, 𝑅 − 𝐷1, 𝑅 − 𝐷2, and 𝑅 − 𝐸𝑘 links,
respectively. We denote 𝑃𝑆 and 𝑃𝑅 as the transmit power at
𝑆 and 𝑅, respectively. We then denote that 𝑛R ∼ 𝒞𝒩 (0, 𝜎2R),
𝑛D ∼ 𝒞𝒩 (0, 𝜎2D), and 𝑛E ∼ 𝒞𝒩 (0, 𝜎2E) as the complex
additive white Gaussian noise components at 𝑅, 𝐷, and
𝐸, respectively. where 𝑣 is the path loss exponent and 𝑑
represents the distance in meters. In our considered network,
it is anticipated that ∣𝑓𝑆1,𝑅∣ > ∣𝑓𝑆2,𝑅∣ and ∣𝑑𝑅𝐷2 ∣ > ∣𝑑𝑅𝐷1 ∣
because it is assumed that 𝑑1𝑅 < 𝑑2𝑅 and 𝑑𝑅𝐷2 < 𝑑𝑅𝐷1 .
A. Information Received and Decoded on Relay
We assumed that, at the 𝑛−th time slot, both 𝑆1 and 𝑆2
simultaneously transmit symbols 𝑥1[𝑛] and 𝑥2[𝑛] with powers
𝛼1𝑃𝑆 and 𝛼2𝑃𝑆 to the relay, respectively, where 𝑃𝑆 is the total
transmit power constraint, 𝛼1 and 𝛼2 denote power allocation
coefficients, such that 𝛼1+𝛼2 = 1 and 𝛼1 > 𝛼2. It is assumed
that 𝑆1 and 𝑆2 have some sort of cooperation and based
on that, power is distributed between them to meet the total
transmission power requirement. Note that the total transmit
power requirement is essential for many practical scenarios
[5, 15]. Similar to [5, 15], uplink NOMA method is used, the
relay first decodes the better source symbol 𝑥1[𝑛] by treating
the symbol 𝑥2[𝑛] of worse source as noise. We consider a FD
relay in this communication scenario, and also assume that
the relay transmit symbols 𝑥1[𝑛] and 𝑥2[𝑛] with powers 𝛼3𝑃𝑅
and 𝛼4𝑃𝑅 to 𝐷1 and 𝐷2, respectively, where 𝑃𝑅 is the total
transmit power at relay. Then, the relay performs SIC to obtain
symbol 𝑥2[𝑛]. Thus, the received signal-to-interference-plus-
noise ratio (SINR) for symbol 𝑥1[𝑛] and signal-to-plus-noise
(SNR) for symbol 𝑥2[𝑛] at the relay are given by
𝛾𝑢𝑥1 =
𝛼1𝑃𝑆 ∣𝑓𝑆1,𝑅∣2
𝛼2𝑃𝑆 ∣𝑓𝑆2,𝑅∣2 + 𝑃𝑅∣ℎ𝑅,𝑅∣2 + 𝜎2𝑅
=
𝛼1𝜌𝑆 ∣𝑓𝑆1,𝑅∣2
𝛼2𝜌𝑆 ∣𝑓𝑆2,𝑅∣2 + 𝜌𝑅∣ℎ𝑅,𝑅∣2 + 1
, (1)
and
𝛾𝑢𝑥2 =
𝛼2𝑃𝑆 ∣𝑓𝑆2,𝑅∣2
𝑃𝑅∣ℎ𝑅,𝑅∣2 + 𝜎2𝑅
=
𝛼2𝜌𝑆 ∣𝑓𝑆2,𝑅∣2
𝜌𝑅𝑅∣ℎ𝑅,𝑅∣2 + 1 , (2)
respectively, where 𝜌𝑆 = 𝑃𝑆𝜎2𝑅 and 𝜌𝑅𝑅 =
𝑃𝑅
𝜎2𝑅
, ℎ𝑅,𝑅 ∼
𝒞𝒩 (0, 𝜆𝑅𝑅) denotes channel coefficient for the relay self-
interference channel. It is noted that the self-interference can
be significantly suppressed so that ℎ𝑅,𝑅 can be regarded as
an independent Rayleigh distributed variable [9].
B. Information Received and Decoded on Destinations
Recalling to the downlink NOMA in [5, 14], in which a su-
perimposed composite signal are regenerated and transmitted.
In our considered network, in order to improve the security
of information transmission, similar to [8, 12], we proposed
the use of so-called artificial noise aided secure transmission
in the relay. As such, by adopting the superposition code, the
transmitted signal at the relay is given by
𝑆[𝑛] =
√
𝛼3𝑃𝑅𝑥1[𝑛] +
√
𝛼4𝑃𝑅𝑥2[𝑛] +
√
𝛼5𝑃𝑅𝑥𝑎, (3)
where 𝑥1[𝑛] and 𝑥2[𝑛] are the regenerated data symbols at
during 𝑛−th time slot, 𝑥𝑎 is an an artificial noise used to
defend against eavesdropping, and 𝛼5 denote power allocation
coefficient for artificial noise, such that 𝛼3+𝛼4+𝛼5 = 1 and
𝛼3 > 𝛼4. In this paper, we assume that the artificial noise
transmitted by the relay is generated from a pseudo random
sequence, which is known to the legitimate receivers (i.e., 𝑅,
𝐷1, and 𝐷2) and remains unknown to the eavesdroppers [8,
12]. Furthermore, according to NOMA protocol, 𝐷1 decodes
own symbol 𝑥1[𝑛] by treating 𝑥2[𝑛] as noise. Therefore, the
received SINR at 𝐷1 for symbols 𝑥1[𝑛] is given as
𝛾𝑑𝑥1 =
𝛼3𝑃𝑅∣ℎ𝑅,𝐷1 ∣2
𝛼4𝑃𝑅∣ℎ𝑅,𝐷1 ∣2 + 𝜎2𝐷
=
𝛼3𝜌𝑅∣ℎ𝑅,𝐷1 ∣2
𝛼4𝜌𝑅∣ℎ𝑅,𝐷1 ∣2 + 1
, (4)
where 𝜌𝑅 = 𝑃𝑅𝜎2𝐷 . On the other hand, according to NOMA
protocol, the destination node with the stronger channel con-
dition (i.e., 𝐷2) needs to firstly detect its partner’s information
(i.e.,𝐷1) and then to obtain own information 𝑥2 using SIC.
Thus, the received SINR for 𝑥1 and SNR for 𝑥2 at 𝐷2 are
respectively given by
𝛾𝑑𝑥1→𝑥2 =
𝛼3𝑃𝑅∣ℎ𝑅,𝐷2 ∣2
𝛼4𝑃𝑅∣ℎ𝑅,𝐷2 ∣2 + 𝜎2𝐷
=
𝛼3𝜌𝑅∣ℎ𝑅,𝐷2 ∣2
𝛼4𝜌𝑅∣ℎ𝑅,𝐷2 ∣2 + 1
, (5)
and
𝛾𝑑𝑥2 =
𝛼4𝑃𝑅∣ℎ𝑅,𝐷2 ∣2
𝜎2𝐷
= 𝛼4𝜌𝑅∣ℎ𝑅,𝐷2 ∣2, (6)
where 𝑥1 → 𝑥2 denotes the SINR required at 𝐷2 to decode
symbol 𝑥1.
On the other hand, for eavesdroppers, following the similar
assumption, we consider the worst-case scenario of large-scale
networks in which eavesdroppers are assumed to have strong
detection abilities and distinguished legal data stream from the
relay [14]. Therefore, the instantaneous SINR for detecting the
legal information of 𝑥1[𝑛] and 𝑥2[𝑛] at the most detrimental
eavesdropper can be expressed as follows:
𝛾𝐸𝜄 = max
𝑘=1,⋅⋅⋅ ,𝐾
𝛼𝜄𝑃𝑅∣𝑙𝑅,𝐸𝑘 ∣2
𝛼5𝑃𝑅∣𝑙𝑅,𝐸𝑘 ∣2 + 𝜎2𝐸
= max
𝑘=1,⋅⋅⋅ ,𝐾
𝛼𝜄𝜌𝐸 ∣𝑙𝑅,𝐸𝑘 ∣2
𝛼5𝜌𝐸 ∣𝑙𝑅,𝐸𝑘 ∣2 + 1
, (7)
where 𝜄 ∈ {3, 4}, 𝜌𝐸 = 𝑃𝑅𝜎2𝐸 is the transmit SNR, 𝜎
2
𝐸 is the
variance of AWGN at eavesdroppers.
III. NEW CHANNEL STATISTICS
In this section, we derive several new channel statistics for
destinations and eavesdroppers, which will be used to derive
the secrecy outage probability in the next section.
Theorem 1: Conditioned on the two source-destination
pairs 𝑆1 − 𝐷1 and 𝑆2 − 𝐷2 share a common DF relay in
considered NOMA networks and the relay using the AN
to confuse eavesdroppers, the PDF of the most detrimental
eavesdropper 𝛾𝐸𝜄 is given by (8)
𝑓𝛾𝐸𝜄 (𝑥)=
⎧⎨
⎩𝐾
𝐾−1∑
𝑘=0
(
𝐾−1
𝑘
) (−1)𝑘𝛼𝜄𝑒− (𝑘+1)𝑥𝜋𝑅𝐸(𝛼𝜄−𝛼5𝑥)
𝜋𝑅𝐸(𝛼𝜄−𝛼5𝑥)2 , 𝑥≤𝛼𝜄𝛼5 ,
0, 𝑥>𝛼𝜄𝛼5 ,
(8)
where 𝜋𝑅𝐸 = 𝜌𝑅𝑑−𝑣𝑅𝐸 .
Proof: From (7), and let 𝑋𝑘 = 𝛼𝜄𝜌𝐸 ∣𝑙𝑅,𝐸𝑘 ∣
2
𝛼5𝜌𝐸 ∣𝑙𝑅,𝐸2 ∣2+1 =
𝛼𝜄𝑋
𝛼5𝑋+1
,
we can obtain the CDF of 𝑋𝑘 as
𝐹𝑋𝑘(𝑥) = Pr(
𝛼𝜄𝑋
𝛼5𝑋 + 1
< 𝑥) = Pr(𝑋 <
𝑥
𝛼𝜄 − 𝛼5𝑥 )
=
{
1− 𝑒−( 𝑥𝜋𝑅𝐸(𝛼𝜄−𝛼5𝑥) ), 𝑥 ≤ 𝛼𝜄𝛼5 ,
1, 𝑥 > 𝛼𝜄𝛼5 ,
(9)
and we can obtain the PDF of 𝑋𝑘 as
𝑓𝑋𝑘(𝑥) =
{
𝛼𝜄𝜋𝑅𝐸𝑒
− 𝑥
𝜋𝑅𝐸(𝛼𝜄−𝛼5𝑥)
(𝜋𝑅𝐸(𝛼𝜄−𝛼5𝑥))2 𝑥 ≤
𝛼𝜄
𝛼5
,
0, 𝑥 > 𝛼𝜄𝛼5 .
(10)
We further obtain the CDF of 𝛾𝐸𝜄 as follows
𝐹𝛾𝐸𝜄 (𝑥)=Pr{𝛾𝐸𝜄<𝑥}=Pr{ max𝑘=1,⋅⋅⋅ ,𝐾𝑋𝑘<𝑥}=𝐹𝑋𝑘(𝑥)
𝐾 .
(11)
Based on (9), (10), (11), and performing some mathematical
manipulations, we obtain (8), which completes the proof of
Theorem 1.
Theorem 2: Conditioned on the two source-destination
pairs 𝑆1 − 𝐷1 and 𝑆2 − 𝐷2 share a common DF relay
in considered NOMA networks, the cumulative distribution
function (CDF) of SINR (SNR) for symbol 𝑥1 is given by
(12)
𝐹𝑆1𝐷1𝑋 (𝑥)=
⎧⎨
⎩
1−( 𝑐11
𝜋𝑅𝑅
+ 𝑥𝛼1𝜋𝑆1𝑅
+ 𝑐21
𝛼2𝜋𝑆2𝑅
+ 𝑥𝛼1𝜋𝑆1𝑅
)
×𝑒−
(𝜋−1
𝑅𝐷1
+𝜋
−1
𝑅𝐷2
𝛼3−𝛼4𝑥 +
1
𝛼1𝜋𝑆1𝑅
)
𝑥
, 𝑥 ≤ 𝛼3𝛼4 ,
1, 𝑥 > 𝛼3𝛼4 ,(12)
where 𝑐1 = 1𝜋𝑅𝑅 (1−
𝛼2𝜋𝑆2𝑅
𝜋𝑅𝑅
)−1, 𝑐2 = 1𝛼2𝜋𝑆2𝑅 (1−
𝜋𝑅𝑅
𝛼2𝜋𝑆2𝑅
)−1,
𝜋𝑆1𝑅 = 𝜌𝑆𝑑
−𝑣
1𝑅 , 𝜋𝑆2𝑅 = 𝜌𝑆𝑑
−𝑣
2𝑅 , 𝜋𝑅𝐷1 = 𝜌𝑅𝑑
−𝑣
𝑅𝐷1
, 𝜋𝑅𝐷2 =
𝜌𝑅𝑑
−𝑣
𝑅𝐷2
, and 𝜋𝑅𝑅 = 𝜌𝑅𝑅𝜆𝑅𝑅.
Proof: Bying using (1), (4), and (5), the achievable
SINR(SNR) associated with symbol 𝑥1 is given by
𝜌𝑆1𝐷1(𝑥1) = min{𝛾𝑢𝑥1 , 𝛾𝑑𝑥1 , 𝛾𝑑𝑥1→𝑥2}. (13)
Recall (1), and let 𝑌1 = ∣𝑓𝑆1,𝑅∣2, 𝑌2 = ∣𝑓𝑆2,𝑅∣2, and 𝑌3 =
∣ℎ𝑅,𝑅∣2, 𝛾𝑢𝑥1 can be reexpressed as 𝛾𝑢𝑥1 = 𝛼1𝜌𝑆𝑌1𝛼2𝜌𝑆𝑌2+𝜌𝑅𝑌3+1 . We
also assume 𝑌4 = 𝛼2𝜌𝑆𝑌2 + 𝜌𝑅𝑌3, and we can easily obtain
the PDF of 𝑥4 as follows:
𝑓𝑌4(𝑦) = 𝑐1𝑒
− 𝑦𝜋𝑅𝑅 + 𝑐2𝑒
− 𝑦𝛼2𝜋𝑆2𝑅 . (14)
We further reexpress (1) as 𝑋1 = 𝛼1𝜌𝑆𝑌1𝑌4+1 , and the CDF of
𝑋1 can be computed by
𝐹𝑋1(𝑥) = Pr{𝑋1 < 𝑥} = Pr
(𝛼1𝜌𝑆𝑌1
𝑌4 + 1
< 𝑥
)
=
∫ ∞
0
[1− 𝑒−
𝑥(𝑌4+1)
𝛼1𝜋𝑆1𝑅 ]𝑓𝑌4(𝑦)𝑑𝑦. (15)
On the other hand, we let 𝑋2 = 𝛾𝑑𝑥1 =
𝛼3𝜌𝑅∣ℎ𝑅,𝐷1 ∣2
𝛼4𝜌𝑅∣ℎ𝑅,𝐷1 ∣2+1 and
𝑋3 = 𝛾
𝑑
𝑥1→𝑥2 =
𝛼3𝜌𝑅∣ℎ𝑅,𝐷2 ∣2
𝛼4𝜌𝑅∣ℎ𝑅,𝐷2 ∣2+1 . Similar to the analysis in
Theorem 1, we can obtain the CDFs of 𝑌2 and 𝑌3 as follows:
𝐹𝑋2(𝑥) =
{
1− 𝑒−(
𝑥
𝜋𝑅,𝐷1
(𝛼3−𝛼4𝑥) ), 𝑥 ≤ 𝛼3𝛼4 ,
1, 𝑥 > 𝛼3𝛼4 ,
(16)
and
𝐹𝑋3(𝑥) =
{
1− 𝑒−(
𝑥
𝜋𝑅,𝐷2
(𝛼3−𝛼4𝑥) ), 𝑥 ≤ 𝛼3𝛼4 ,
1, 𝑥 > 𝛼3𝛼4 ,
(17)
According to (13)the CDF of 𝐹𝑆1𝐷1𝑋 (𝑥) can be expressed as
𝐹𝑆1𝐷1𝑋 (𝑥)=1−(1−𝐹𝑋1(𝑥))(1−𝐹𝑋2(𝑥))(1−𝐹𝑋3(𝑥)). (18)
Substituting (14), (15), (16), and (17) into (18), with some
mathematical manipulations, we obtain (12), which completes
the proof of Theorem 2.
Theorem 3: Conditioned on the two source-destination
pairs 𝑆1 − 𝐷1 and 𝑆2 − 𝐷2 share a common DF relay in
the NOMA networks, the CDF of SNR of 𝑆2 − 𝐷2 link is
given by
𝐹𝑆2𝐷2𝑋 (𝑥) = 1−
𝛼2𝜋𝑆2𝑅𝑒
−( 1𝛼2𝜋𝑆2𝑅+
1
𝛼4𝜋𝑅𝐷2
)𝑥
𝛼2𝜋𝑆2𝑅 + 𝜋𝑅𝑅𝑥
, (19)
Proof: Bying using (2) and (6), the achievable SIN-
R(SNR) associated with symbol 𝑥2 is given by
𝜌𝑆2𝐷2(𝑥2) = min{𝛾𝑢𝑥2 , 𝛾𝑑𝑥2}. (20)
Following similar arguments as that of Theorem 2 for the CDF
of (SNR) for symbol 𝑥1, we obtain (19), which completes the
proof of Theorem 3.
IV. SECRECY OUTAGE PROBABILITY AND EFFECT
SECRECY THROUGHOUT ANALYSIS
In this paper, the secrecy outage probability (SOP) and
effect secrecy throughout(EST) are used as a secrecy per-
formance metric. Additionally, the secrecy capacity of the
𝑆1 −𝐷1 and 𝑆2 −𝐷2 can be expressed as
𝐶𝑆1𝐷1 =
(
log2(1 + 𝜌𝑆1𝐷1)− log2(1 + 𝛾𝐸3)
)+
, (21)
and
𝐶𝑆2𝐷2 =
(
log2(1 + 𝜌𝑆2𝐷2)− log2(1 + 𝛾𝐸4)
)+
, (22)
respectively, where (𝑥)+ = max{𝑥, 0}.
A. Exact Secrecy Outage Probability
Given the secrecy information rate 𝑅1 and 𝑅2 for the
𝑆1 − 𝐷1 and 𝑆2 − 𝐷2, a secrecy outage is declared when
the instantaneous secrecy capacity drops below 𝑅1 and 𝑅2,
respectively. Based on (21), the SOP for 𝑆1 −𝐷1 is given by
𝑃𝑆1𝐷1(𝑅1)=Pr{𝐶𝑆1𝐷1 < 𝑅1}
=Pr{𝜌𝑆1𝐷1 < 2𝑅1(1 + 𝛾𝐸3)− 1}
=
∫ ∞
0
𝐹𝑆1𝐷1𝑋
(
2𝑅1(1 + 𝑥)− 1) 𝑓𝛾𝐸3 (𝑥)𝑑𝑥. (23)
Based on (12) and (8), and using the assumption 𝛼3 > 𝛼4
in Section II, we obtain 𝑃𝑆1𝐷1(𝑅1) as (24), shown on the top
of next page, where 𝜃(𝑥) = 2
𝑅1𝑥+2𝑅1−1
𝛼1𝜋𝑆1𝑅
, and 𝜉 = min((𝛼3𝛼4 +
1)2−𝑅1 − 1, (𝛼3𝛼5 + 1)2−𝑅1 − 1). Similarly, for the 𝑆2 − 𝐷2
user, based on (22), the SOP is given by
𝑃𝑆2𝐷2(𝑅2)=Pr{𝐶𝑆2𝐷2 < 𝑅2}
=Pr{𝜌𝑆2𝐷2 < 2𝑅2(1 + 𝛾𝐸4)− 1}
=
∫ ∞
0
𝐹𝑆2𝐷2𝑋
(
2𝑅2(1 + 𝑥)− 1)𝑓𝛾𝐸4 (𝑥)𝑑𝑥. (25)
Substituting (8) and (19) into (25), we can obtain the expres-
sion of SOP of the 𝑆2 − 𝐷2 user as (26) on the second top
of next page. Though the analysis on information decoded for
𝑆1 − 𝐷1 and 𝑆2 − 𝐷2 user pairs in Section II, we find the
secrecy outage occur of the 𝑆1 −𝐷1 user and 𝑆2 −𝐷2 user
are independent. In other words, the SOP of the 𝑆1−𝐷1 user
pair has no effect on that of 𝑆2−𝐷2 user pair and vice versa.
As such, the SOP of the proposed NOMA-ANFDR scheme
for the considered networks can be expressed as [14]
𝑃𝑁𝑂𝑀𝐴−𝐴𝐹𝑅𝑆𝑜𝑢𝑡 = 1− (1− 𝑃𝑆1𝐷1)(1− 𝑃𝑆2𝐷2). (27)
Following a similar procedure to derive the SOP of the
proposed NOMA-ANFDR scheme, we can obtain SOP of the
NOMA-ANHDR scheme, which is used as a baseline to com-
pare with the proposed NOMA-ANFDR scheme. Specifically,
the SOP of the NOMA-ANHDR scheme is given by
𝑃𝑁𝑂𝑀𝐴−𝐴𝐻𝑅𝑆𝑜𝑢𝑡
= 1−𝐾2
𝐾−1∑
𝑘1=0
𝐾−1∑
𝑘2=0
(−1)𝑘1+𝑘2
(
𝐾 − 1
𝑘1
)(
𝐾 − 1
𝑘2
)
𝜏1
𝛼3𝛼4
𝜋2𝑅𝐸
×𝜛(𝜉)
∫ 𝛼4
𝛼5
0
𝑒
− 22𝑅2𝑥𝛼2𝜋𝑆2𝑅+
22𝑅2𝑥
𝛼4𝜋𝑅𝐷2
+
(𝑘2+1)𝑥
𝜋𝑅𝐸(𝛼4−𝛼5𝑥)
(𝛼4 − 𝛼5𝑥)2 𝑑𝑥, (28)
where
𝜛(𝜉) =
∫ 𝛼3
𝛼5
𝜉
𝑒
− (𝑘1+1)𝑥
𝜋𝑅𝐸(𝛼3−𝛼5𝑥)
(𝛼3 − 𝛼5𝑥)2 𝑑𝑥
+
∫ 𝜉
0
Φ(𝑥)
𝑒
− 22𝑅1𝑥𝛼1𝜋𝑆1𝑅−
𝜋
−1
𝑅𝐷1
+𝜋
−1
𝑅𝐷2
𝛼3(2
2𝑅1 (𝑥+1)−1)−1−𝛼4
−𝜋
−1
𝑅𝐸
(𝑘1+1)𝑥
(𝛼3−𝛼5𝑥)
(𝛼3 − 𝛼5𝑥)2 𝑑𝑥,
(29)
𝜉 = min{(𝛼3
𝛼4
+ 1)2−2𝑅1 − 1, (𝛼3
𝛼5
+ 1)2−2𝑅1 − 1}, (30)
Φ(𝑥) =
1
1 +
𝛼2𝜋𝑆2𝑅
𝛼1𝜋𝑆1𝑅
(22𝑅1(1 + 𝑥)− 1)𝑒
− 22𝑅1−1𝛼1𝜋𝑆1𝑅 , (31)
and
𝜏1 = 𝑒
−( 1𝛼2𝜋𝑆2𝑅+
1
𝛼4𝜋𝑅𝐷2
)(22𝑅2−1)
, (32)
respectively. We note that HD relaying is known to suffer from
a spectral efficiency loss compared to FD relaying due to its
time-orthogonal relay listening/forwarding suffering, so half-
duplex suffer from 50% loss in data rate, there is 1/2 factor
in both data transmission and eavesdropping capacities [9].
𝑃𝑆1𝐷1 =1−𝐾
𝐾−1∑
𝑘=0
(−1)𝑘
(
𝐾 − 1
𝑘
)
𝛼3
𝜋𝑅𝐸
[ ∫ 𝛼3
𝛼5
𝜉
1
(𝛼3 − 𝛼5𝑥)2 𝑒
− (𝑘+1)𝑥
𝜋𝑅𝐸(𝛼3−𝛼5𝑥) 𝑑𝑥
+ 𝑒
− 2𝑅1−1𝛼1𝜋𝑆1𝑅
∫ 𝜉
0
(
𝑐1
1
𝜋𝑅𝑅
+ 𝜃(𝑥)
+
𝑐2
1
𝛼2𝜋𝑆2𝑅
+ 𝜃(𝑥)
)
𝑒
− 2𝑅1𝑥𝛼1𝜋𝑆1𝑅−
(𝜋
−1
𝑅𝐷1
+𝜋
−1
𝑅𝐷2
)
𝛼3(2
𝑅1 (𝑥+1)−1)−1−𝛼4
− (𝑘+1)𝑥
𝜋𝑅𝐸(𝛼3−𝛼5𝑥)
(𝛼3 − 𝛼5𝑥)2 𝑑𝑥
]
, (24)
𝑃𝑆2𝐷2 = 1−𝐾
𝐾−1∑
𝑘=0
(−1)𝑘
(
𝐾 − 1
𝑘
)
𝑒
−(2𝑅2−1)( 1𝛼2𝜋𝑆2𝑅+
1
𝛼4𝜋𝑅𝐷2
)
𝜋𝑅𝐸
∫ 𝛼4
𝛼5
0
𝛼4𝛼2𝜋𝑆2𝑅𝑒
− 2𝑅2𝑥𝛼2𝜋𝑆2𝑅+
2𝑅2𝑥
𝛼4𝜋𝑅𝐷2
+
(𝑘+1)𝑥
𝜋𝑅𝐸(𝛼4−𝛼5𝑥)
(𝛼2𝜋𝑆2𝑅 + (2
𝑅2(𝑥+ 1)− 1))(𝛼4 − 𝛼5𝑥)2 𝑑𝑥. (26)
B. Optimization of the Power Allocation Parameter 𝛼5 and
Effect Secrecy Throughout
The optimal value of power allocation parameter 𝛼5 that
minimizes the exact SOP given (27) can be obtained though
𝛼∗5 = argmin
0≤𝛼5<1
𝑃𝑁𝑂𝑀𝐴−𝐴𝑁𝐹𝐷𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑡 . (33)
We first analytically determine the first-order derivative of
𝑃𝑁𝑂𝑀𝐴−𝐴𝑁𝐹𝐷𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑡 with respect to 𝑎5 for a given 𝑎3 and
𝑎4. We numerically find that ∂𝑃𝑁𝑂𝑀𝐴−𝐴𝑁𝐹𝐷𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑡 /∂𝑎5 is first
negative and then positive. We then analytically determine
the second-order derivative of 𝑃𝑁𝑂𝑀𝐴−𝐴𝑁𝐹𝐷𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑡 with re-
spect to 𝑎5 for given 𝑎3 and 𝑎4. We numerically find that
∂2𝑃𝑁𝑂𝑀𝐴−𝐴𝑁𝐹𝐷𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑡 /∂
2𝑎5 is always positive when 0 < 𝑎5 <
1. Therefore, we conjecture that there is a unique value
of 𝑎5 within 0 < 𝑎5 < 1, referred to as 𝑎∗5 , which
achieves the minimum 𝑃𝑁𝑂𝑀𝐴−𝐴𝑁𝐹𝐷𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑡 . This conjecture
will be supported by the numerical results in Section V. We
denote 𝑃 ∗𝑁𝑂𝑀𝐴−𝐴𝑁𝐹𝐷𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑡 as minimum exact SOP achieved
by setting 𝛼5 = 𝛼∗5 in (27).
In this paper, the EST is defined as the product of the
secrecy rate and the maximum secure transmission probability
(i.e., the minimum SOP) , which is given by
𝑇𝑁𝑂𝑀𝐴−𝐴𝐻𝑅𝑆 = (𝑅1 +𝑅2)(1− 𝑃 ∗𝑁𝑂𝑀𝐴−𝐴𝐹𝑅𝑆𝑜𝑢𝑡 ), (34)
where (1− 𝑃 ∗𝑁𝑂𝑀𝐴−𝐴𝑁𝐹𝐷𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑡 ) means the transmission from
the source was successfully received by the destination for
both 𝑆1−𝐷1 and 𝑆2−𝐷2 user pairs, but not at eavesdroppers.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we provide numerical results to examine the
secrecy performance of the proposed NOMA-ANFDR scheme.
The NOMA-ANHDR scheme and NOMA in cooperative half-
duplex-relay without considering security (NOMA-HDR-w/o-
SE, without considering the presence of eavesdroppers [5]) is
also shown as benchmarks in the figures. We assume that all
nodes are assumed to be collinear with 𝑑1𝑅 = 0.2, 𝑑2𝑅 = 0.5,
𝑑𝑅𝐷1 = 0.8, 𝑑𝑅𝐷2 = 0.6, and 𝜈 = 4. We also assume that
employing fixed transmit power allocation for legal users in
these NOMA schemes. We set 𝛼1 = 0.9, 𝛼2 = 0.1, 𝛼3 = 9𝛼4,
𝑅1 = 0.5, 𝑅2 = 1, 𝑃𝑆 = 𝑃𝑅 = 20dB, and 𝑃𝐸 = 2dB.
Fig. 2 plots the SOPs of the proposed NOMA-ANFDR
scheme, NOMA-ANHDR scheme, and NOMA-HDR-w/o-SE
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Fig. 2. SOP versus different values 𝛼5 with 𝑅1 = 0.5 and 𝑅2 = 1.
with 𝐾 = 3 and 𝐾 = 6. We first see that the SOPs of the
proposed NOMA-ANFDR and NOMA-ANHDR schemes first
decrease and then increase as 𝑎5 increases, which implies that
there is a unique 𝑎5 that minimizes the SOP, i.e., 𝑎∗5. This
supports our conjecture on 𝑎5 in Section IV. Secondly, it is
observed from Fig. 2 that the theoretic SOPs achieved by
the proposed NOMA-ANFDR and NOMA-AHFDR schemes
match their simulated SOPs. This confirms the correctness of
the results present in (27) and (28). Thirdly, it is observed from
Fig. 2 that, both the SOPs of the proposed NOMA-ANFDR
and NOMA-ANHDR schemes perform better than NOMA-
HDR-w/o-SE. This indicates that artificial-noise enhances the
physical layer security against eavesdropping attack. It is also
observed from Fig. 2 that the NOMA-ANFDR scheme signif-
icantly outperforms the NOMA-ANHDR scheme, illustrating
the security benefits of exploiting the FD mode to prevent
eavesdropping attacks.
Fig. 3 plots minimum SOPs versus 𝑃𝑅 with 𝜋𝑅𝑅 = 0dB
and 𝜋𝑅𝑅 = 4dB. We see that the minimum SOPs of the three
schemes tend to decrease with 𝑃𝑅, but the proposed NOMA-
ANFDR scheme achieves a best performance, and the NOMA-
HDR-w/o-SE scheme has the worst secrecy performance as
compared to other AN-aided schemes, showing that the securi-
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Fig. 3. Minimum secrecy outage probabilities versus 𝑃𝑅 with 𝐾 = 3,
𝑅1 = 0.5, 𝑅2 = 1, 𝜋𝑅𝐸 = 2dB, 𝜋𝑅𝑅 = 0dB, and 𝜋𝑅𝑅 = 4dB.
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Fig. 4. EST versus 𝑅2 with 𝐾 = 3, 𝜋𝑅𝑅 = 4dB, and 𝜋𝑅𝐸 = 2dB.
ty benefits of the exploiting AN-aided and FD mode in relay in
defending against eavesdropping. It is also from Fig. 3 that the
secrecy performance of the NOMA-ANFDR scheme relative
to NOMA-ANHDR scheme becomes more prominent as 𝜋𝑅𝑅
decreases, e.g., from 𝜋𝑅𝑅 = 4 dB to 𝜋𝑅𝑅 = 0 dB. This can be
explained by the fact that the NOMA-ANFDR scheme has a
better secrecy performance than the NOMA-ANHDR scheme
when the self-interference is well suppressed.
Fig. 4 plots the EST versus 𝑅2. One can observe that the
NOMA-ANFDR scheme achieves the highest EST since it has
the lowest minimum SOP among the three schemes. It is also
from Fig. 4 that the proposed NOMA-ANFDR scheme can
use a highest secure transmission rate for 𝑆2 −𝐷2 user pair
when the case of achieving the highest EST.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we proposed a new NOMA-ANFDR scheme
in a cooperative relay network in the presence of 𝐾 eaves-
droppers. To analyze the benefits of the NOMA-ANFDR
scheme, we derive its SOP in closed form. It was shown
that the NOMA-ANFDR scheme significantly outperforms
the NOMA-ANHDR and the NOMA-HDR-w/o-SE scheme
by achieving a lowest SOP and a highest EST. This result
indicates that adopting the joint of FD and AN techniques
at relays can greatly improve the physical layer security in
cooperative NOMA systems.
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